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FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN STATISTICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Abstract. The foundational issues discussed by David Freedman are examined from the 
point of view of an investigator faced with the choices they imply. It turns out that in 
practice the boundaries between the various philosophies are less sharp than might be 
expected from the passion with which their differences have been argued for a long time. 
There is considerable common ground , and each approach gains by borrowing tools from 
the other. 
1. Introduction 
David Freedman's paper consists of two parts. The first describes the frequentist 
and Bayesian approaches to probability and statistics, the second is concerned with 
the validity of statistical models. Both emphasize the importance of putting realism 
above convenience and dogma. I shall here consider these issues from the point of 
view of an investigator faced with the choices implied by Freedman's distinctions , 
namely between 
• data analysis without a model; 
• a, frequentist model involving unknown parameters ; 
• A Bayesian model which assigns a known distribution to these parameters . (I 
am restricting attention here to what Freedman calls the "classical" Bayesian 
position; bridge building to the "radical" position is more difficult). 
2. Model-free data analysis 
At this stage, a data set will typically be examined , analyzed, and organized in 
many different ways in an attempt to bring out its salient features and to pinpoint 
meaningful effects. However, the question then arises whether these effects are real. 
Unfortunately, except in very special circumstances (for an example see Freedman 
and Lane ( 1983)), this question cannot be answered wi Lhout a probability model. 
The difficulty is greatly exacerbated by the multiple facets of such an approach. 
The suggested effects of interest , for example , will tend to be those that appear 
most significant out of large numbers that were examined , some in detail, some 
1062
E. L. Lehmann 
only out of the corner of an eye, and many of which - in a phrase of Cournot 
(1843) - "have left no traces". The appearance of their significance may thus be 
greatly exaggerated. Cournot thought that the problem posed by this distortion 
was insoluble. However, often the situation can be saved by a second stage with 
new data at which a probability model is used to test the much smaller and more 
clearly defined set of effects found interesting at the first stage. 
3. The modeling decision 
The choice between an analysis with or without model depends largely on the 
extent of our knowledge concerning the underlying situation. Do we know enough 
from past experience and/or a theoretical understanding of the situation to be clear 
about the questions to be asked and to be able to formulate an adequately realistic 
model? Or do we have to examine the data to see what the problems are and to 
get an idea of the kind of model that might be appropriate? 
In this connection it is important to realize that models used for different pur-
poses need to meet different standards of realism . A well known classification (see 
for example Box, Hunter and Hunter (1978), Cox (1990) and Lehmann (1990)) 
distinguishes between on the one hand explanatory or substantive models which 
try to portray in detail the principal features of the situation and to explain their 
interrelations, and on the other empirical or off-the-shelf models, which employ the 
best fitting model from a predetermined standard family. The latter have little ex-
planatory power but nevertheless can be very useful for limited practical purposes 
such as predicting school enrollments or forecasting elections. (Early astronomers 
were able to make very accurate predictions based on elaborate models 1 that bore 
little resemblance to reality. Their insistence on circular motions is reminiscent of 
the ubiquitous assumption of linearity in the kind of regression model discussed by 
Freedman in Section 5 of his paper .) As Freedman points out, the success of such 
predictions could and should be routinely monitored . A danger of empirical models 
is that once they have entered the literature, their shaky origin and limited purpose 
have a tendency to be forgotten. 
4. Model-based inference 
Suppose now that a model has been selected which we believe to be adequate, 
and that we know exactly which questions we want to ask . Let us assume that the 
problem has been formulated as a choice among a set of possible decisions and that 
we can assess the loss L( (}, d) that would result from taking decision d when (} is 
the true parameter value . The observations are represented by a random quantity 
X which has a probability distribution depending on 0. A statistical procedure is 
1 A recent account of the accomplishments and ultimate failures of these models can be 
found in North (1994). 
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a rule (or function) 8 which specifies the decision d = 8( x) to be taken when X 
takes the value x. Finally, the performance of the decision rule 8 is measured by 
the average loss resulting from its use, 
R(e, 8) = EL[e, 8(X)] (1) 
This expected loss is called the risk function of 8. 
A classical Bayesian has a prior distribution W fore; for the sake of simplicity we 
suppose that W has a density w(e). Within this Bayesian framework, the quantity 
of interest is the expected risk 
r6 = j R(e, 8)w(e)de (2) 
and the 1'10S~ desirable procedure is that for which r6 is as small as possible . De-
termining this optimum procedure is in principle straightforward, alt:1ough it may 
be computationally difficult . 
The hardest part often is the choice of W. In practice, prior distributions, 
just like many probability models, frequently are of the off-the-shelf kind, that is, 
they are chosen from a convenient standard family which is sufficiently flexible to 
permit modeling the rough qualitative features desired. A popular choice is an 
uninformative prior that corresponds to a state of ignorance concerning e. 
Frequentists do not face the issue of determining a prior, but they have to 
contend with another difficulty. Rather than minimizing (2), they seek a procedure 
that minimizes R(e, 8) for all e. Since, unfortunately, such a procedure does not 
exist, various devices are used to work around this problem, none of them really 
compelling. We mention here only one such criterion: minimizing the maximum 
risk. A procedure achieving this is said to be minimax . 
5. Common ground 
The distinctions between the three approaches: (i) model-free data analysis, (ii) 
frequentist and (iii) Bayesian model-based inference have been heatedly debated for 
a long time. However, in practice there is more contact - and the lines separating 
the three modes are less sharp - than this debate suggests. 
For example, an exploratory data analysis may perform informal tests with 
ad hoc models , for guidance on which hypothesis suggested by the data to pursue; 
conversely, the subsequent formal-inference stage may utilize the first stage to search 
for the models it needs. 
We shall in the remainder of this section restrict attention to some of the rela-
tionships between (ii) and (iii) . Additional discussion of these and other points of 
contact between the two approaches can be found in Diaconis and Freedman (1986) 
and Lehmann (1985) . 
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(a) Previous experience . For a large class of important situations in areas such 
as medicine, agriculture, business and education, a great body of related earlier 
experience is available to draw on. This experience provides an observed frequency 
distribution of B's of which we have reason to believe that the present (unknown) 
B-value is a typical member. A Bayesian is likely to accept this distribution as 
an appropriate prior (although possibly making slight modifications to allow for 
special features in which the present situation might differ from the past). A fre-
quentist, even without a clearly defined random mechanism for producing the B's, 
may analogously work with the empirical distribution as if it were the true fre-
quency distribution of a random quantity. Although they will think very differently 
both of this distribution W and of the assumed distribution of X given () (along 
the lines indicated in Sections 2 and 3 of Freedman's paper), both will be led to the 
procedure /5 minimizing (2) and thus to the same decision . 
(b) A fundamental connection. Even when no prior information is available, 
Bayes procedures are of importance to frequentists. This is a. consequence of a 
fundamental theorem ofWald, which states that the only sensible (from :1 frequentist 
point of view) procedures are those that are Bayes solutions for some prior W or 
limits of such solutions. In the light of this result, it is often useful to examine 
a frequentist procedure from a Bayesian point of view to see whether it is Bayes 
with respect to some prior and if so, whether this prior seems at all plausible. In 
this connection it is interesting to note that minimax procedures are often Bayes 
solutions corresponding to an uninformative prior. 
(c) Performance. In the opposite direction from (b), a Bayesian, after having 
computed the Bayes procedure o corresponding to a preferred prior, can learn much 
about the procedure by studying its risk function R((), /5). This latter step, although 
inconsistent with a Bayesian philosophy, is now acknowledged as useful by many 
Bayesians. (For a discussion from a contrary viewpoint, see Berger (1986).) 
5. Conclusions 
1. It seems clear that model-free data analysis, frequentist and Bayesian model-
based inference and decision making each has its place. The question appears not 
to be - as it so often is phrased - which is the correct approach but in what 
circumstances each is most appropriate. 
2. In practice, the three approaches can often fruitfully interact, with each 
benefiting from consideration of the other points of view. 
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3. Although the debates between adherents of Bayesian and frequentist philoso-
phies have been carried on with much heat for a long time, in practice neither side 
very often lives up to its principles, since both models and priors frequently are of 
the off-the-shelf variety. 
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